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Abstract Protests that target firms’ socially irresponsible
behavior are increasingly organized via digital media. This
study uses two methods to investigate the effects that
online protests and mitigating firm responses have on
shareholders’ and consumers’ evaluation. The first method
is a financial analysis that includes an event study which
measures the effect of online protests on the target firm’s
share price, as well as an investigation of the boundary
effects of protest characteristics. The second method is an
online experiment that assesses the effect of an online
protest campaign on consumers’ perception and purchase
intention, as well as any mitigating effects that a firm’s
response may have. Contrary to recent studies suggesting
that participation in online protests is only token support
without any substantive effects, our results show that
online protests do hurt. Firms can expect to suffer financial,
reputational, and sales damage when an online protest
campaign mobilizes consumers successfully. We also show
that online protests are more likely to take firms by surprise
than offline protests. Firms can exacerbate or reduce the
damage by their response. We find that although firms may
repair the damage to consumers’ purchase intentions, the
negative effects on a brand’s image are harder to rectify.
The results have valuable implications for protest orga-
nizers and managers faced with the task of responding.
Keywords Consumer activism  Corporate social
responsibility  Response strategies  Stakeholder
management  Reputation  Financial impact
Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) implies that firm
policies and practices exceed the narrow, technical, and
legal requirements to create economic value (Davis 1973).
Firms are increasingly considered as social actors that,
beyond their mere economic self-interest, adhere to or even
actively change norms in society (Scherer and Palazzo
2007). Within the CSR literature, scholars see firms as
corporate citizens, which does not only mean that corpo-
rations need to behave like ‘good citizens’, but that they are
responsible for protecting citizen rights (Matten and Crane
2005). Other actors in society apply ever-increasing pres-
sure on firms to act as a corporate citizen by means of their
CSR policy and practices (Matten and Crane 2005).
Consumer protests, the public display of consumers’
disapproval of a firm’s socially irresponsible behavior, may
motivate firms to improve their corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) policies and practices (King 2008; King and
Soule 2007; Den Hond and De Bakker 2007). An
increasing body of research indeed indicates that consumer
protests can severely damage such a firm’s reputation
(Bartley and Child 2011; King 2008; King and Soule
2007). Feedback from stakeholders who are important for
the survival of the targeted firm often mediates the effect of
protests on corporate decision makers (Vasi and King
2012). Activist groups thus often aim to influence
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stakeholders inside and outside the organizational bound-
aries, who in turn pressure the targeted firm to behave more
socially responsible (Aguilera et al. 2007). Shareholders
are, for example, sensitive to the negative publicity that a
protest engenders and may disinvest if they expect this will
affect the share price or future cash flows (Groening and
Kanuri 2013; Mackey, Mackey, and Barney 2007; Vasi and
King 2012). Protests may also affect consumers’ image and
its associated brands, and purchase intention (Krishna-
murthy and Kucuk 2009).
Digital media, such as social networking sites,
increasingly offer activists an efficient platform to orga-
nize such protests by exchanging information about a
firms’ CSR performance and uniting consumers with a
negative attitude against a firm to voice their disapproval
(Krishnamurthy and Kucuk 2009; Xia 2013). Conse-
quently, digital media are important channels for com-
municating with targeted firms and their stakeholders
about social issues (Castello´ et al. 2013; De Bakker and
Hellsten 2013; Palazzo and Basu 2007; Schultz et al. 2013;
Whelan et al. 2013). Firms’ CSR managers need to better
understand how online protests affect their firms’ and
brands’ value in order to manage unexpected situations
efficiently. Online protests may require a significant
change in CSR managers’ stakeholder management capa-
bilities, with the focus less on the one-way communication
of CSR and more on two-way, or networked, dialog with
the activist groups and their supporters (Castello´ et al.
2013; Schultz et al. 2013).
While extant research demonstrates the impact of offline
protests targeted at firms (Braunsberger and Buckler 2011;
Chavis and Leslie 2009; Friedman 1999; Klein et al. 2004;
Koku et al. 1997; Neilson 2010; Yuksel and Mryteza
2009), we know little about the effects of online protests on
firm and brand value (Koku 2012), and about how firms
should respond to mitigate the potential damage (Xia
2013). Although CSR managers are increasingly aware of
the power of the internet to inform their stakeholders about
their CSR policies and practices (Palazzo and Basu 2007),
activist groups’ requests are often not dealt with effec-
tively.1 Therefore, this study investigates the impact of
online protests on shareholders’ and consumers’ evalua-
tion, as well as the interventions that the targeted firm
undertakes when it becomes the target of a protest. Our
research question is: ‘‘To what extent do online protests
influence shareholders’ and consumers’ evaluation of the
targeted firm, and how do responses from the targeted firm
mitigate damage due to online protests?’’
We develop a conceptual model with nine hypotheses
about the effect of online protests on the evaluation of
shareholders and consumers, and the mitigating effects that
firm responses may have on the online protest’s damage.
We employ two methods to test our hypotheses. First, we
present a financial analysis that includes an event study
(n = 116) which examines the effect of online protests on
the targeted firms’ share price, and a regression analysis
that assesses the boundary conditions of the protest char-
acteristics. Second, we conduct an online experiment
(n = 201) to study the effects of an online protest on
consumers’ image of a targeted firm, their purchase
intention, and the mitigating effects of a targeted firm’s
response. The results of these two approaches add to our
understanding of online protests’ effects and provide
practitioners insights into the importance of online protests
and how stakeholder evaluations are influenced.
Our study contributes to CSR theory in three ways. First,
our assessment of the impact of online protests contributes
to the discussions on the effectiveness of low-effort protest
(Den Hond and De Bakker 2007; Van Laer and Van Aelst
2010). Second, we study the effects of protests on share-
holders’ and consumers’ evaluation, rather than the policy
outcome. Following Aguilera et al. (2007)’s multilevel
stakeholder framework, we show how activist groups target
firms’ stakeholders on an organizational level (shareholders
and consumers). Last, we contribute to theory on how firms
respond to protest (Eesley and Lenox 2006; King 2008; Xia
2013; Yuksel and Mryteza 2009) by examining the miti-
gating effects that firm responses produce.
Theory
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
Our conceptual model is based on the organizational level
of the multilevel theory of social change (Aguilera et al.
2007). This hierarchical model includes stakeholders who
influence CSR on the individual level (employees), orga-
nizational level (shareholders, managers, and consumers),
national level (governments), and transnational level
(NGOs). The stakeholders on the organizational level are
split into insider and outsider stakeholders. Insider stake-
holders, such as managers and shareholders, have the most
direct power over CSR decisions, as they negotiate directly
in the decision-making politics within a firm. Outsider
stakeholder groups, such as consumers, put pressure on the
insider stakeholders by means of their voice (protest) or
exit (refraining from consumption). Stakeholders on each
level pressure firms to engage in CSR activities and may
interact while doing so. Our study specifically examines
this interaction between the (trans)national level and the
organizational level. Figure 1 shows our conceptual model1 See, e.g., http://socialmediainfluence.com/2010/10/05/social-
media-screw-ups-a-history/ for a list of cases.
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and hypotheses. We develop the hypotheses in the para-
graphs below.
The Effect of Online Protests on Share Value
Although the impact of protests on firms is difficult to
measure (Bartley and Child 2011; King and Soule 2007;
Vasi and King 2012), a number of studies have assessed the
effect of such actions. Bartley and Child (2011) examine
the effects of anti-sweatshop protests on consumer and
shareholder evaluations: reputation, sales, and share prices.
Their results show that protests can decrease the CSR
ratings and lower the share prices. The effect of the
investigated protests on sales and reputation depended,
however, on the type of firm and the protest intensity. First,
these protests only decreased the sales of highly specialized
and recognizable firms. Second, only highly intense pro-
tests tarnished the reputation of firms with a good
reputation.
Other studies focus on the effects of offline protests
on a specific stakeholder. First, firms that have experi-
enced a drop in their reputational standing are more
vulnerable and are, therefore, more likely to respond
positively to protesters’ requests (King 2008). Second,
Chavis and Leslie (2009) demonstrate that calls to boy-
cott French wine in the USA during the war in Iraq did
indeed result in significantly lower weekly sales. Third,
most studies on the effects of offline protests use the
financial value of the firm as the outcome variable. When
stakeholder support turns into stakeholder activism, the
effects on the financial value are mixed. In an event
study, King and Soule (2007) demonstrate that protests
influence a firm’s financial performance negatively when
measured as a short-term abnormal variance in the share
price. In a later study, however, Vasi and King (2012)
test this relation for long-term effects. In an analysis of
stakeholder activism targeted at more than 200 US firms
between 2004 and 2008, they find that protests did not
increase the firms’ perceived environmental risk and
consequently did not affect their financial performance in
the long term. Shareholders’ perceptions of protests may
mediate their effect on the targeted firms’ financial
value: An analysis of corporate social events which have
either positive or negative effects on other stakeholders
shows that shareholders may react positively to events
that other stakeholders perceive as negative (Groening
and Kanuri 2013).
Similarly, an online protest provides shareholders with
information about a firm’s possible socially irresponsible
behavior, which may result in social pressure to disinvest in
the targeted firm, as well as concerns about its future cash
flows. We assume that shareholders update their beliefs
about the future firm performance when they become
aware of an online protest. It might take some time for an
online protest to gain momentum before shareholders
notice the protest, but from that moment onward the stock
markets will reflect the shareholders’ expectations regard-
ing the future sales and profitability, with any changes in
these expectations are reflected in the share prices (King
and Soule 2007).
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Fig. 1 Conceptual model of the effects of online protests based on Aguilera et al’s (2007) multilevel framework of social change
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In an event study by Koku (2012), however, no signif-
icant effect is found concerning the stock market reaction
to online protests. Koku, however, questions the general-
izability of his findings, and we believe there are three
possible explanations for the lack of effects. First, the study
was based on a small sample size (n = 63). Second, the
protests included in the study were all calls to boycott,
which require more effort from the protest participants than
protests only aimed at changing consumers’ attitudes.
Third, individuals rather than formal protest groups, which
have more resources to mobilize consumers behind their
cause, initiated and organized all the protests. As such, the
literature is inconclusive on whether or not protests via
online channels affect the targeted share value like tradi-
tional offline protests do. In recent years, shareholders have
made increasing use of online channels to gather market-
relevant information (O’Connor 2013). We therefore
expect online protests to have an effect on the shareholder
expectations of a targeted firm’s future cash flow. Thus,
adding to King and Soule’s (2007) findings regarding the
offline situation, we expect online protests to also nega-
tively affect the targeted firm’s share price. This leads to
our first hypothesis:
H1 Online protests have a negative effect on the price of
a firm.
Protest Size
Previous research identifies protest size as an important
factor in changing firm behavior and as potentially having
financial consequences for a targeted firm (Bartley and
Child 2011; Luders 2006; Tilly 2004). Online protests
which succeed in attracting large numbers of participants
help activist groups draw investors’ and traditional media’s
attention, which gives this group a powerful position with
respect to the targeted firms. However, King and Soule
(2007) do not find a significant relationship between protest
size and share price. They indicate that their dataset is
limited to protests aimed at US firms, which may bias their
results, as US firms tend to be less stakeholder-centric than
European firms. Online mass mobilization may draw the
attention of various stakeholders, including the sharehold-
ers. Therefore, despite the mixed results to date, we expect
online protests with a higher number of participants to have
a stronger negative effect on a firm’s share price. We thus
hypothesize:
H2 Online protests with a higher number of participants
have a stronger negative effect on the share price of a firm
than smaller protests.
Protest Characteristics
Besides the question of whether there is an effect on the
share price of a firm under attack, it is important to inves-
tigate the conditions under which such an effect occurs.
Building on the above theoretical development section, we
hypothesize that Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) protest char-
acteristics affect the protest size. Legitimacy refers to ‘a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions’ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy is a char-
acteristic of stakeholder groups that may increase pres-
sure on firms (Mitchell et al. 1997; Eesley and Lenox 2006).
Protest organizers differ in the degree to which they are
perceived as legitimate actors in society, which provides
themwith moral resources, such as support from consumers.
As a moral authority, legitimacy may grant activist groups
access to a firm’s constituencies that are critical for its
survival, for example, its consumers (Mitchell et al. 1997).
We hypothesize that the large-scale mobilization of con-
sumers to join an online protest campaign requires an acti-
vist group perceived as legitimate (Bennett and Segerberg
2012; Van den Broek et al. 2012). Public opinion surveys
show that NGOs and public organizations to a lesser degree
enjoy high levels of legitimacy (see, e.g., Edelman 2016),
giving them the capability for mass mobilization, and
qualifying them to represent their support as based on a CSR
issue. In contrast, individuals may lack such legitimacy and
are less able to mobilize large numbers of consumers than
NGOs. We therefore hypothesize:
H3a The number of participants in online protests targeted
at a firm depends on the legitimacy of the protest initiator.
Second, legitimacy also refers to the request made by
activist groups (Eesley and Lenox 2006). As suggested by
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder theory, the cause and
its solution that an activist group supports need to be per-
ceived as legitimate. We argue that when protests are
product-related and appeal predominantly to a firm’s con-
sumer base, they are more likely to appeal less to the
general public than value-related issues, such as CSR
issues (Swimberghe et al. 2011). We do not expect the
legitimacy of activists’ request to have a different effect on
the online setting than it has been shown to have on offline
protests. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H3b Highly legitimate protest requests relating to widely
relevant value-related issues result in higher protest par-
ticipation than protest requests relating to narrower pro-
duct-specific issues.
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Third, we expect the urgency of the request, in other
words the time frame of a protest’s demand, to have an
effect on consumer participation in such a protest. Given
media’s short attention span, consumers may prefer to
participate in protests urgently demanding a change in a
firm’s current behavior. Eesley and Lenox (2006) do not
find that a very urgent request affects firm responses, but
did not assess a request’s effect on participation. We thus
propose the following hypothesis:
H3c Urgent protest requests calling for the cessation of
the current firm behavior result in higher protest partici-
pation than protests against a firm’s planned future
behavior.
The Effect of Online Protests on Consumers’ Image
The pressure on CSR policy and practices also depends on
consumers’ perceptions and behavior with respect to a
firm (Chavis and Leslie 2009). First, an online protest can
affect consumers by negatively affecting their attitude
toward a firm. We assume that online protests aimed at
highlighting and changing undesired corporate behavior
have a cognitive effect on the way consumers exposed to
the protest perceive such a firm. In other words, the way
consumers think and feel about a targeted firm will
become more negative after their exposure to protest
(King and Soule 2007). Technological convenience and
social connectedness are two online mechanisms that
increase exposure to a protest in order to reach a large
number of consumers (Kucuk and Krishnamurthy 2007).
First, the technological convenience of the internet makes
wide-reaching communication more affordable and
easier, offering protesters an efficient structure to mobi-
lize consumers for protests targeted at firms. Second, the
social connectedness and interactivity of the internet
stimulate the formation of online communities and
encourage consumers to spread information about the
protest. This mass interactivity enables consumers to
personalize the frames that activist groups offer (Bennett
and Segerberg 2012). Both the technological convenience
and social connectedness help online communities reach a
broader audience than is possible in an offline setting,
allowing them to reach out to consumers who would
normally not be exposed.
The effect of online negative information on consumer
attitude has been well studied in relation to consumers
sharing their negative experiences about firms, i.e., nega-
tive electronic word-of-mouth (negative eWOM) (Eberle
et al. 2013). These studies find that negative eWOM has a
stronger effect than positive eWOM, indicating that bad
news about a firm is somehow conspicuous and influences
how consumers feel about the firm in question. Similarly,
we expect online protests to affect consumers’ evaluation
of such a firm:
H4 Exposure to an online protest negatively affects
consumers’ image of a firm.
Moderating Effect of Firm Response on Image
Firms are, however, not powerless when faced with an online
protest and a number of options are open to them. First, a
proactive communication strategy prior to a protest might
prevent, or mitigate, its negative effects (McDonnell and
King 2013; Yuksel and Mryteza 2009). However, proactive
communication strategies that promote a firm’s CSR strategy
in an overly positive way may be considered as ‘green-
washing’ by consumers (Aji and Sutikno 2015). Green-
washing refers to the marketing of CSR practices that is seen
as excessive and inappropriate self-promotion of the firm
(Lyon and Montgomery 2013). Previous research suggests
that greenwashing is positively related to consumer skepti-
cism (Aji and Sutikno 2015) and negatively related to trust in
environmentally friendly products (Chen and Chang 2013)
and corporate legitimacy (Seele and Gatti 2015).
We assume that any negative effects after a protest will be
mitigated if the targeted firm implements an adequate
response strategy. Traditionally, the literature suggests that
conceding to a protest signals a sense of responsibility
toward consumers, which will result in positive consumer
perceptions (Bradford and Garrett 1995; Conlon and Murray
1996). Subsequent research shows that this relation is not
that simple (Huang 2006; Lee and Song 2010; Xia 2013). A
response strategy’s effectiveness depends on the firm’s
control over the protest issue, as well as the protest’s level of
evidence (Huang 2006). By conceding to a protest when
consumers (other than the protesters) do not perceive the
protest as justified, the protest may harm a firm’s reputation
(Lee and Song 2010). Furthermore, the strength of the con-
sumer’s relationship with the firm moderates the effect of an
online protest (Xia 2013): The stronger consumers’ rela-
tionship with a firm, the more they will tolerate a defensive
response. We propose four response strategies that vary in
their degree of compliance with a protest request (Bradford
and Garrett 1995; Conlon and Murray 1996; Oliver 1991):
(1) moving with (conceding to the protest), (2) moving
toward (accommodating dialog with the protesters to justify
firm behavior), (3) moving against (denying and counter-
acting the protest), and (4) moving away (ignoring the pro-
test). As the two positive response strategies denote a higher
responsiveness to the protesters’ wishes than the latter two
strategies (Xia 2013), we propose:
H4a The firm’s response to a protest moderates the
negative effect that an online protest has on consumers’
The Effect of Online Protests and Firm Responses on Shareholder and Consumer Evaluation 283
123
perception of that firm, because the closer the firm moves
toward the protest objectives, the weaker the negative
effect.
The Effect of Online Protests on Purchase Intention
An online protest can affect consumers as outsider stake-
holders by reducing their purchase intention, which implies
that, besides the previously described exposure, online
protests need to influence consumers in order for them to
forego buying the targeted firm’s products or services.
However, evidence of this effect is limited in an online
setting. Cheung and Thadani (2012) call for further
research into the relationship between the online sharing of
information about firms and consumer purchase intentions.
Following research on the offline setting (Bartley and Child
2011), we propose:
H5 Exposure to an online protest negatively affects
consumers’ intention to purchase the targeted firm’s
products.
Moderating Effect of Firm Response on Purchase Intention
Similar to the effect on consumers’ perceptions of the firm,
we assume that any negative effects a protest may have on
consumers’ purchase intention will be mitigated if the firm
implements a response strategy that is closer to the wishes
of the protesters (Xia 2013):
H5a The firm’s response to a protest moderates the
negative effect that an online protest has on consumers’
purchase intentions, because the closer the firm moves
toward the protest objectives, the weaker the negative
effect.
Financial Analysis
In this section, we investigate the effects of online pro-
tests targeted at firms in terms of the financial impact they
have on them. Given that an online protest may change
shareholders’ expectations about the future firm perfor-
mance (King and Soule 2007; Rappaport 1987), the onset
of an online protest can be immediately translated into an
adjustment of the firm’s market value (Fama 1970). We
assume that online protest campaigns provide capital
markets with new information. First, online protests are
an effective and low-cost tool that makes egregious cor-
porate behavior publicly visible. Second, the nature of the
internet offers consumers an easy and convenient way to
participate in a protest against undesired corporate
behavior. In turn, increased participation in an online
protest targeted at firms makes a decline in sales more
likely. Consequently, as more people follow the protest
and revise their feelings about the attacked company, the
more likely the shareholders are to adjust their risk esti-
mations of the firm’s future cash flows. Third, when an
online protest reaches a certain threshold regarding its
number of supporters, it can draw the attention of tradi-
tional (financial) media that shareholders follow. Conse-
quently, new information about a firm under attack
reaches the capital markets, which may lead to a reeval-
uation of its share price. Such mainstream attention for a
protest based on purported irresponsible behavior comes
at extra costs, with the total amount depending on the
company’s chosen response. A positive response to pro-
tests might lead to the payment of compensation, or the
abandonment of lucrative business opportunities. On the
other hand, if a firm does not respond, or even counter-
attacks, shareholders may expect such a strategy to pro-
voke penalties, or long-term litigation, for which financial
provisions will have to be made, once again affecting
their future cash flow expectations.
Data Description
We built a database of 164 cases of online protest targeted at
publicly traded companies during the period 1998–2011. All
the cases were identified with the help of the LexisNexis
media database and the Google search engine, using a
combination of keywords such as online, protest, boycott,
petition, and action, as well as the names of all companies
currently listed on various important global stock exchan-
ges. Additional cases were found by searching a number of
popular social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube) for references to these companies and related
protests. We excluded 48 observations with confounding
events occurring before or after the event period. Con-
founding events are share-price-influencing events such as
changes in firm’s board members that occur at about the
same time as the focal event, which we identified from news
sources before and at the time of the protests. We used daily
stock returns and Thomson Financial Datastream’s and
Thomson Worldscope’s returns of the benchmark index to
obtain a measure for the expected returns. We calculated the
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) to use these
in the financial analysis.
Event Study Results
We applied an event study of abnormal returns to examine
the value relevance of a protest for shareholders (H1). The
rationale for an event study is that, given market efficiency,
perfect information, and the rationality of shareholders
(Fama 1991), the relevance of an event is measureable in
terms of abnormal returns, i.e., a stock return that deviates
284 T. van den Broek et al.
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from its expected value. Expectations about the daily
returns of common stocks are usually best described by the
market model (Brown and Warner 1985), which is a sta-
tistical model based on the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) and relates the return of a given stock i to the
return of the benchmark portfolio m at time t:
E Ritð Þ ¼ ai þ biRmt ð1Þ
where E Ritð Þ = expected stock return of firm i on day t,
Rmt = returns on the market portfolio on day t,
ai; bi = parameter estimates obtained from the regression
of Rit on Rmt
The problem that we try to solve by using an event study
is that we do not know what would have happened in the
absence of an online protest. Therefore, we construct a
synthetic comparison observation based on the CAPM
model. This model describes what would have happened in
the absence of a protest by relating the return of a given
stock to market return. The benchmark portfolio is the
standard market portfolio as provided by Fama–French
datasets. This is a typical approach and includes US-listed
firms. There is no contamination of the market outcome by
the negative news, as the model is predicted for each firm
before the event, or before bad news was made known, i.e.,
we calculate the beta during the observation period and
then subsequently use it to calculate the expected return
during the event period. The difference between the actual
and the expected return then defines the abnormal return.
Any deviation in the realized return from the return that the
model predicted is attributed to the online protest. This
allows the general effect of online protests on stock value
to be assessed across protests.
We use an observation period of 239 days to obtain the
regression parameters of the expected return for each event,
following the approach of King and Soule (2007), who
examine the influence of offline protests on the financial
performance of US companies in the period 1962–1990. In
order to avoid the event potentially influencing the esti-
mation, the estimation window ends 30 days prior to the
event. We measure the abnormal return attributable to the
protest as the difference between actual and expected
return of the share of firm i at time t:
ARit ¼ Rit þ E Ritð Þ ¼ Rit  a^i þ b^iRmt
 
ð2Þ
Using a sample of N protests, we calculate the mean
effect of all the protests as the average of the abnormal






However, it is unrealistic to only assume a significant
effect on the day of the protest itself. Information about the
protest might leak to shareholders in advance, or the protest
may need time to disseminate its message to a wide audi-
ence (King and Soule 2007). Consequently, the observation
of abnormal returns during a window pertaining to the
launch of the protest is more appropriate. Hence, we
aggregate daily abnormal returns during the period [-t1, t2]
into a cumulative average abnormal return:




The statistical significance of the cumulative average
abnormal return is tested, whereby we assume normally
















ARit  CAAR t1;t2½ 
 !vuut
ð6Þ
We calculate the CAAR for a range of event windows
and find that a symmetric window of 11 days has the
highest Z-value (-4.79), which is the most significant
event window (Brown and Warner 1985). Hence, the
estimation period starts five days prior to the day the online
protest started and ends five days after this. We obtained a
cumulative average abnormal return of -.84%, similar to
King and Soule’s (2007) results. Table 1 provides more
details of the results.
We find a difference in the distribution of the daily
average returns that has not been reported before. Whereas
shareholders anticipate offline protests (King and Soule
2007; Koku et al. 1997), we find that the share value does
not change abnormally prior to the online protest date,
indicating that online attacks on firms are more likely to
take firms (and shareholders) by surprise. The first signif-
icant negative abnormal return is found on day two, which
reaches its lowest value five days after the protests started.
This suggests that it takes some time before shareholders
become aware of an online protest and are faced with its
full impact, which may be due to the word-of-mouth dif-
fusion process inherent in the way social media are used.
We thus confirm our hypothesis (H1) and find that online
protests have a negative influence on the financial value of
a firm, although, in relation to the start date of the protest,
this effect is later than the effect of offline protests. An
online protest may give no advanced warning about the day
when consumers are called to action. Such an online attack
grows under the radar before reaching a critical mass. A
firm suddenly becomes aware of the angry mob and is
expected to respond immediately, without being given time
to develop a well thought-out response strategy. This
The Effect of Online Protests and Firm Responses on Shareholder and Consumer Evaluation 285
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surprise effect can make online protests more threatening
for firms than offline protests, because firms are generally
not given advanced warning (e.g., via lobbying) and jour-
nalists may be pressured by journalists to respond quickly.
Regression Results
In order to test Hypothesis H2, we regressed the cumulative
abnormal return during the event window on protest par-
ticipation. We further included protest characteristics as
defined by Eesley and Lenox (2006), namely the legitimacy
of the protest organization, the legitimacy of the protest
request, and the urgency of the request. Second, we con-
trolled for the number of social media channels used,
because a firm attacked from multiple fronts may suffer
more harm than one attacked from a single social media
platform (Castello´ et al. 2013). Third, we operationalized
the control variable firm size with the total sales (Eesley
and Lenox 2006). The estimation equation for the cumu-
lative abnormal returns of firm j during the event window
for protest i is as follows:
CARij ¼ c0 þ c1NGOij þ c2PubOrgij þ c3Requestij
þ c4Urgencyij þ c5Social Mediaij þ c6FirmSizeij
þ c7Participationij þ gij
ð7Þ
with g  Nð0; r2ijÞ, where
– CARij: Cumulative abnormal return for firm j during
protest i.
– NGOij: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if protest
i against firm j has been organized by an NGO, 0 if not
PubOrgij Dummy variable taking the value 1 if protest
i against firm j has been organized by a public
organization, 0 if not.
– Requestij: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
claim of protest i against firm j is value related, 0 if the
claim of protest is product related.
– Urgencyij: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if protest
i against firm j relates to current firm behavior, 0 if it
relates to the firm’s future plans.
– SocialMediaij: Number of social media channels used
by protest i against firm j.
– FirmSizeij: Total sales of parent firm j attacked by
protest i.
– Participationij: Number of explicit consumer actions,
including online petition signatures, Facebook likes,
YouTube views, etc.
– c: Parameters to be estimated.
– g; r2ij: Error term and variance.
With participation as a focal driver of shareholders’
evaluation of a protest, we eventually specified Eq. 8 to test
our hypotheses H3a–H3c, i.e., the drivers for joining a
protest. We used a log–log transformation to ensure that
the participation rate remains positive when predicted. We
additionally controlled for the capabilities and resources of
the protest group and the targeted firm by means of the
number of social media channels used in the protest, as
well as the total sales of the firm in the year of the protest.
The estimation equation is defined as follows:
ln Participationð Þi¼ d0 þ d1NGOi þ d2PubOrgi
þ d3Requesti þ d4Urgencyi
þ d5lnðSocial MediaÞi þ d6Firm Sizei
þ fi
ð8Þ
with f  N 0; r2i
 
, where d: Parameters to be estimated,
f; r2i : Error term and variance, and all other terms as
previously defined.
Table 1 Daily average return
around the event data in respect
of 116 online protests
Day(s) Cumulative average abnormal return (%) Z-value Frequency of negative returns (%)
[-5, ?5] -0.838 -4.788*** 63.56
-5 0.019 0.193 52.54
-4 0.020 0.223 50.85
-3 -0.030 -0.305 56.78
-2 0.030 0.284 53.39
-1 -0.133 -1.163 50.85
0 0.094 0.989 50.00
1 -0.069 -0.746 53.39
2 -0.223 -2.164** 54.24
3 -0.058 -0.464 47.46
4 -0.200 -1.885* 54.24
5 -0.287 -2.351** 55.93
n = 116, * p\ .1, ** p\ .05, *** p\ .01
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Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statis-
tics and bivariate correlations. Table 3 summarizes the
regression results. The first column of Table 3 presents the
estimation results of Eq. 7. The effective number of
observation is 109, and the explained variance is 0.113.
This is largely in line with other event studies in this field
(King and Soule 2007). The F-value is 5.97 (p\ .001),
indicating the model’s high validity. Protest participation
has a significant effect (d_7 = 0.000, p\ .001) on the
share price and, hence, confirms Hypothesis 2. We do not
find a significant relationship between firms with more
sales being generally less exposed to risk (d_6 = 0.000,
p\ .001). Last, protests organized by rival firms have a
significant (d_2 = .0260, p\ 0.05) effect on protest
participation.
The second column of Table 3 shows the results of
Eq. 8. The effective number of observation is 116. The R2
(0.267) and the F-value (9.08) indicate a high goodness of
fit. Except for protest urgency, all the coefficients are sig-
nificant and show the expected sign. Consequently, protests
organized by NGOs and other public organizations do
indeed generate higher levels of participation than protests
organized by individuals (respectively, d_1 = 1.612 and
d_2 = 2.575, both p\ .01). Moreover, protests generate
Table 2 Overview of means, standard deviations, and correlations
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 CAAR -0.01 0.04 1
2 Participation 60,784 336,277 0.21 1
3 NGO 0.38 0.49 -0.09 -0.09 1
4 Individual 0.55 0.50 0.02 0.06 -0.86*** 1
5 Public
Organization
0.07 0.26 0.14 0.05 -0.22** -0.31** 1
6 Request 0.83 0.37 -0.09 0.08 -0.32*** 0.34 -0.06 1
7 Urgency 0.73 0.44 0.13 0.09 -0.13 0.08*** 0.09 -0.16** 1
8 Social media 1.08 0.81 -0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.06 1
9 Firm size (in
100,000 $)
38,249 48,671 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.13 1
N = 116,  p\ .1, * p\ .05, ** p\ .01, *** p\ .001
Table 3 Regression
coefficients of the effects of
participation on cumulative
abnormal returns and protest
characteristics on participation
Model 1 (H2) Model 2 (H3a–c)
Regression on: Cumulative abnormal return Participation
Coefficient (standard error) Coefficient (standard error)
Constant 0.000 (0.015) 4.772 (0.746)***
Group legitimacy
Individuals Baseline Baseline
NGOs 0.008 (0.008) 1.612 (0.521)**
Public organizations 0.026 (0.013)* 2.575 (0.739)**
Request legitimacy
Product-related claim Baseline Baseline
Value-related claim -0.009 (0.013) 1.117 (0.488)*
Request urgency 0.011 (0.009) 0.018 (0.594)
No. of digital channels -0.003 (0.003) 1.628 (0.573)*
Firm sizea 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)*
Participationa -0.000 (0.000)***
R2 0.113 0.269
Adj. R2 0.056 0.134
F-value 5.97*** 9.08***
N 109 116
* p\ .05, ** p\ .01, *** p\ .001
a For reading convenience, these coefficients are multiplied by 100,000
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higher attention and reach if organized for value-related
rather than product-related reasons (d_3 = 1.117, p\ .05).
Next, we find a significant correlation between firm size in
terms of sales and protest participation (d_6 = 0.000,
p\ .05). Further, the number of social media channels
does increase an online protest’s reach (d_5 = 1.628,
p\ .01). To test the robustness of our findings, we con-
ducted Ramsay’s RESET test in Stata to check for omitted
variable bias. This test was negative for both equations,
which suggests that no important variables were omitted in
the regression analyses. Last, we tested both equations for
cohort effects, as protests take place in different years. The
inclusion of the year in which an online protest took place
had no significant effect on the analyses.
Experimental study
Design and Sample
The purpose of the experiment is to test the effect of an
online protest on consumers’ image of a firm, consumers’
purchase intention, and how a firm’s response to a protest
mitigates these effects. The firm’s response is one of the
four strategies described above (Clemens and Douglas
2005; Conlon and Murray 1996; Oliver 1991), which we
label moving with (i.e., compliance), moving toward (e.g.,
entering into a discussion), moving against (e.g., counter-
attack), and moving away (i.e., ignoring the protest). In
order to test these effects, a one-factor between-subjects
experimental design was used. The experimental factor was
the attack–response condition with six levels: zero mea-
surement, moving with, moving toward, moving against,
moving away, and attack only. Moving away differs from
the attack only condition, as, in the former, the participants
in the experiment saw the protest web site followed by an
online news item in which the targeted firm was described
as not being available for comment. In the latter condition,
the participants only saw the protest web site. Therefore, in
the ‘moving away’ condition, consumers may assume the
firm has ethically questionable reasons for explicitly
refusing to comment on the protest or may have something
to hide.
We selected milk as the consumer product at which to
target an experimental protest campaign, as this is a com-
mon repeat-purchase product that does not generally elicit
high consumer involvement, which could otherwise influ-
ence the results. Furthermore, we selected an animal wel-
fare issue as the protest cause, because animal welfare is
one of the most common causes in the consumer food
industry. A total of 201 participants, recruited by a mar-
keting research bureau that offered them a small financial
reward for taking part, completed the study. The partici-
pants were selected on the basis that they are responsible
for purchasing milk and their regular milk consumption.
The sample group, of which 58% was male, was between
18 and 80 years of age (M = 50,05; SD = 14.99). Only
2.5% of the participants were a vegetarian, who may have a
higher than average interest in animal welfare issues, which
is relevant for this experiment. The participants were sent
an email that included a link to the study web site. They
participated online and were randomly assigned to one of
the attack-response conditions.
Procedure
The experiment was executed via an online application and
started with a short introduction that indicated how long the
experiment would take. Each participant was asked which
milk brand he\she purchases, and in the remainder of the
experiment that specific brand was used as the target of the
attack. We do not control for all firm-related concepts, such
as brand loyalty, because the participants indicated their
preferred brand, thus limiting the variation in respect of
brand loyalty. Additionally, as the participants were ran-
domly assigned to the conditions, any differences would be
averaged. Those who do not purchase milk were excluded
from the study.
The procedure differed per condition. For the zero
measurement, the participants had to fill out a question-
naire about the firm producing their chosen brand. In the
attack only condition, the participants saw a mock web site
of a well-known and generally well-respected environ-
mental NGO with a message that the firm producing their
chosen brand harms the environment. The attack was based
on existing protests against the use of raw materials from
palm plantations, which lead to the destruction of the
rainforest. In the mock protest, the claim was that the milk
producer procured cattle food containing palm kernels,
thereby contributing to the destruction of rainforest, as
natural forest is cleared to plant palm trees. These partic-
ipants then filled out the same questionnaire as in the zero
measurement condition. In the other four conditions—the
four different firm response strategies—the participants
saw the same attack and subsequently an online news item
describing the online protest, as well as a statement from
the targeted firm comprising one of the response strategies.
The participants in these conditions filled out the ques-
tionnaire again. At the end of the questionnaire, all the
participants received debriefing information that the protest
was not real and was only for research purposes, and the
firm in question’s positive environmental performance was
highlighted.




Manipulation: As shown above, there were six different
manipulations: zero measurement vs. ‘moving with’ vs.
‘moving toward’ vs. ‘moving against’ vs. ‘moving away’
vs. ‘attack only.’ The four strategies were manipulated by
means of an online news item. The attack was manipulated
by the message on the NGO’s web site. There was also a
zero measurement group with no manipulation, which was
the control group. The text of the manipulation is attached
as an appendix.
Dependent Variables
In this study, there are four dependent variables, three
relating to what consumers think and feel about the firm
(attitude toward the firm, product and service quality, and
environmental image) and one relating to consumers’
purchase intention. First, 20 commonly used items were
measured on a seven-point semantic differential scale to
determine the attitude toward the firm (Aaker 1997). Some
items were reversed scored to prevent bias. Confirmatory
factor analysis initially showed a two-factor model in
which 19 of the 20 items loaded on one factor. The item
expensive/inexpensive did not load on the same factor and
was omitted from the set of items. Reliability analysis
showed a Cronbach’s a of .97 for the remaining items.
Second, the short form of the consumer-based corporate
reputation scale was used to determine the image (Walsh
et al. 2009). Two of the original five factors were used:
product and service quality, and environmental image, each
consisting of three items measured on a seven-point scale.
The latter factor was adapted to remove items relating to
social, rather than environmental, responsibility, because
our experimental design included a protest attack based on
environmental grounds. We checked the scale using a
factor analysis which identified both factors with reliability
a of .85 and .83. Last, consumers’ purchase intention was
measured with one seven-point item ascertaining the extent
to which the participants were sure that they would buy the
chosen product if they were in a supermarket and needed
milk.
Control Variables
The general willingness of consumers to take part in pro-
tests was controlled for by measuring the trait action
willingness, by asking if they had joined an anti-firm pro-
test during the previous year (with multiple answer options,
as well as a ‘yes, other…’ option). These data were
transformed into a dichotomous variable for the analysis.
Results
A manipulation check (n = 70), using items adapted from
Clemens and Douglas (2005), showed that consumers’
perception of each response strategy differed significantly:
moving with (F = 30.88, p\ .01, partial g2 = .58),
moving toward (F = 18.03, p\ .01, partial g2 = .45),
moving against (F = 4.31, p = .01, partial g2 = .20), and
moving away (F = 3.98, p = .01, partial g2 = .15). All
manipulations passed Levene’s test for homogeneity
(p\ .1). We separated the manipulation from the main
experiment to avoid endogeneity.
Examining the results of the main experiment, an
ANOVA shows a main effect of the experimental condition
on the participants’ attitude toward the firm
(F(5191) = 7.18, p\ .001, partial g2 = .16), thus con-
firming Hypothesis H4. A Tukey post hoc analysis shows
significant contrasts between the zero measurement and all
the other levels of the condition, signifying that all the
manipulations had a negative effect on consumers’ attitude
toward the firm. Furthermore, the difference between the
attack and moving away conditions showed significance,
whereby the moving away strategy resulted in an even
worse attitude toward the firm than the attack only condi-
tion. This result shows that no matter how the firm
responds, the negative effect of the protest on consumers’
attitude toward the firm remains. Consequently, Hypothesis
4a is not supported. On the contrary, when a firm moves
away by explicitly refusing to comment on the protest, the
negative effect of the protest is exacerbated. The control
variable, the trait action willingness, shows no significance
(main effect (F(1191) = 2.309, p = .130, partial
g2 = .012) or interaction effect (F(5191) = .661,
p = .654, partial g2 = .017), indicating that previous
involvement in protests does not affect attitude toward the
firm.
In respect of the effects of the protest campaign on the
two image constructs (product and service quality, and
environmental image), a MANOVA shows a main effect of
the experimental condition (F(15,569) = 2.40, p\ .01,
partial g2 = .06). Once again, no significant results are
found for the control variable and the trait action willing-
ness. The univariate results show that the experimental
condition has a significant effect on the firm image
regarding quality (F(5193) = 4.41, p\ .01, partial
g2 = .10) and environment (F(5193) = 5.81, p\ .001,
partial g2 = .11). In respect of the firm image concerning
product and service quality, the contrasts between the
strategies moving away and moving toward, as well as the
zero measurement, are significant. The moving away
strategy results in a more negative image concerning the
quality than the moving toward strategy and the zero
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measurement; this is a similar result to that described above
regarding the attitude toward the firm. In respect of the firm
image concerning the environment, the contrasts between
the zero measurement and moving with, moving against,
moving away, and the attack only condition are significant,
as is the contrast between moving away and moving toward
conditions. With the exception of moving toward, all the
conditions have a more negative effect on the image con-
cerning the environment than the zero measurement has.
Furthermore, moving away also has a more negative effect
on the environmental image than moving toward has.
Together, these results support Hypothesis H4, showing
that online protests harm consumers’ image of a firm.
Nevertheless, they do not firmly support Hypothesis H4a,
as the firm’s response does not mitigate this negative
effect. Again, however, the effect of the firm response
differs: If the firm moves away from the protest by
explicitly refusing to comment on it, the negative effect of
the protest also increases.
Looking at the effects of the online protest campaign on
the participants’ purchase intention, we find support for
Hypothesis H5. The ANOVA shows a significant main
effect of the experimental condition (F(5193) = 3.35,
p\ .01, partial g2 = .08), showing that respondents
exposed to the protest were less likely to purchase the
product than the control group. A Tukey post hoc analysis
showed significant differences between the zero measure-
ment and the moving away strategy, the moving against
strategy, and the attack only condition (see Table 3). This
is wholly in line with Hypothesis H5a: If the firm moves
with the protest by complying with its request, or moves
toward it by entering into a discussion, the negative effect
of the protest on consumers’ purchase intentions is atten-
uated. In this case, we also found that the control variable
and the trait action willingness have an effect on the pur-
chase intention (F(1193) = 4.57, p\ .05, partial
g2 = .02). Those participants who had joined some kind of
action during the previous year had a lower purchase
intention (M = 3.10, SD = 1.79) than those without the
trait action willingness (M = 3.95, SD = 2.02).
Discussion
In this paper, we examined the effects of online protests on
the stakeholder evaluations of the targeted firm. Instead of
assessing the impact of protests on a single performance
indicator, we studied the impact of protests on both
shareholders and consumers. Additionally, we explored the
boundary conditions of protest characteristics and assessed
the mitigating effects of firm responses. Empirically, we
focused on online protests targeted at firms that use digital
media, such as social media, and we propose that such
protests would negatively influence shareholders’ and
consumers’ evaluation of the firm. We found that online
protests do affect these primary stakeholders. Firms,
however, are not powerless when attacked. This study
makes a further contribution by assessing the effects of the
firm’s response to the protest and whether certain response
strategies mitigate or exacerbate the effects of an online
protest.
Summary of Findings and Scientific Implications
The results of this study show that low-effort participation
in protests, called ‘slacktivism’ (Kristofferson et al. 2014),
can also function as a meaningful form of protest support.
Even though individual contributions do not require a
significant effort or cost, their combined clicks add to the
critical mass of the protest, attracting the attention of the
targeted firm and the press. Owing to the nature of online
campaigns, the sum of many small contributions by online
slacktivists, which are visible to all, may be more than
efforts of a relatively small core group of activists. In this
study of the effect of online protests on firms’ financial
value, we find protests affect shareholders’ expectations,
indicated by a drop in share price (H1). This finding is in
line with earlier event studies on the effect of offline pro-
tests on financial value (Bartley and Child 2011; King and
Soule 2007; Vasi and King 2012) and deviates from
Koku’s (2012) tentative conclusion that online protests
may not affect firm value. Again, all observations with
confounding activity that could also have affected the share
price were removed from the sample. The time it takes for
online protests to influence firm value in this way is an
important factor that differs from offline protests. Online
protests may take firms and markets by surprise. The event
study shows that protests have no effect on a firm’s value
prior to the date the online protest is launched. Share-
holders may be unaware of a protest before the launch, as
the related information needs some time to diffuse
throughout the online community. Added to this, the full
reach of a protest and its ability to mobilize a large number
of supporters are often far from clear at the outset. Our
findings suggest that there is either a delay before share-
holders become aware of a protest, or that they postpone
their reaction to see whether the protest grows.
The regression analysis shows that the size of the protest
participation influences the financial value of the targeted
firm negatively (H2). As a contribution to earlier mixed
findings regarding the effect of protest size on the firm
value (King and Soule 2007; Luders 2006), we show that
consumer participation in an online protest is an antecedent
of the effect that a protest has on firms’ financial value.
Furthermore, we explore Eesley and Lenox’s (2006)
boundary conditions (H3a–c) to explain participation in
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online protests. Protest legitimacy and request legitimacy
do increase the size of a protest in terms of participation.
Despite optimistic claims about the democratizing effect of
digital media (Bennett and Segerberg 2012), our findings
show that NGOs and public organizations can still mobilize
protest participants more efficiently than individuals. Our
findings regarding the urgency of the request that the
protest organizers make are in line with those of Eesley and
Lenox (2006) regarding the offline situation, but does not
support our Hypothesis H3c, as the request urgency did not
lead to an increase in the protest participation in our study.
This means that when protests have a specific deadline for
the targeted firm this does not increase potential partici-
pants’ motivation to join the protest.
In support of our fourth hypothesis (H4) in the experi-
mental study, we find that exposure to an online protest
campaign does indeed negatively affect how consumers
perceive a firm. Based on consumer evaluations in response
to four firm response strategies, we find partial support for
Hypothesis H4a, which posits that the closer a firm moves
toward the wishes of a protest, the weaker this negative
effect. However, none of a firm’s response strategies can
prevent damage to its reputation; even if it were to fully
comply with the request of the activist group, this would
still damage consumers’ evaluations of it. This finding
seems to modify the earlier confirmation that a prosocial
communication strategy following a protest might prevent,
or mitigate, a protest’s negative effects (Bradford and
Garrett 1995; Conlon and Murray 1996; Yuksel and Mry-
teza 2009). While a firm’s reputation is damaged no matter
what response strategy it adopts, our results show that a
firm can exacerbate the problem if it adopts a ‘moving
away’ strategy and explicitly refuses to comment on the
protest. In this case, consumers’ attitude toward such a firm
becomes even more negative. In addition, we have found
that the ‘moving away’ strategy has a negative effect on
consumers’ evaluations of the quality of a firm’s products
and that all response strategies, other than complying, have
a negative effect in terms of the firm’s environmental
image.
We also find that, in line with H5, an online protest
affects consumers’ actions. After being exposed to an
online protest, consumers are less likely to buy the relevant
firm’s products. This result follows Cheung and Thadani’s
(2012) call for research on the link between the electronic
sharing of information about brands and purchase inten-
tion. Furthermore, we find that the two response strategies
through which a firm moves closer to the wishes of the
protest, thus moving with, i.e., complying with the request,
and moving toward, i.e., engaging in a dialog with the
community, do mitigate the damage to sales that a protest
inflicts (supporting H5a). When a company does not
respond, or reacts with a counter-attack strategy,
consumers’ intention to purchase that firm’s products
remains damaged (H5a). In this instance, this effect is even
stronger for consumers with a history of participating in
similar protests. This finding confirms that a prosocial
communication strategy following a protest can prevent, or
mitigate, a protest’s negative effects by signaling a sense of
responsibility for consumers (Bradford and Garrett 1995;
Conlon and Murray 1996).
Our findings contribute to CSR literature in three ways.
First, our findings combine earlier studies on the effect of
protests on shareholder evaluation (Bartley and Child
2011; King 2008; King and Soule 2007; Vasi and King
2012) and consumer evaluation (Bradford and Garrett
1995; Conlon and Murray 1996; Huang 2006; Lee and
Song 2010; Xia 2013). This combination of insider and
outsider CSR stakeholders’ evaluation is important, as
shareholders tend to pressure firms on the basis of short
term instrumental motives, while consumers may find
ethical motives more important (Aguilera et al. 2007;
Mackey et al. 2007). This means that firms face the
dilemma of needing to balance their response to their
stakeholders with potentially conflicting interests. Second,
we study the dynamics between insider and outsider
stakeholders and the inter-level relation between activist
groups and consumers. Last, we contribute to the ongoing
discussion on the use of digital media, such as social
media, to engage consumers in CSR from both activist
groups’ and firms’ perspective (Castello´ et al. 2013; Eberle
et al. 2013; Lyon and Montgomery 2013; Palazzo and Basu
2007; Schultz et al. 2013; Whelan et al. 2013).
Practical Implications
Our research provides activist groups with insights into
how to improve their chances of influencing firm behavior.
Furthermore, we provide commercial managers with useful
results that can help them optimize their response when
they become the focus of an online protest. New strategies
and tactics for conflicts played out on the internet are
continually being discovered and improved (Whelan et al.
2013). We specifically contribute four practically applica-
ble findings for protest organizers. First, we confirm that
online protests can be worthwhile. They can affect firms by
changing the mindset of consumers to view the targeted
firm in a less positive light, and they can influence con-
sumers’ purchase intentions and can also decrease the
firm’s share value. Second, our findings suggest that
cooperative activist groups may provide firms with an exit
strategy by helping them enter into a discussion to find a
mutually agreeable solution (Kneip 2013). Our experi-
mental findings suggest that a win–win solution is possible,
while our event study findings suggest that activists have a
window of opportunity during which the firm is acutely
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aware of the market’s perception of its future risk. Third,
we suggest that protest organizers need to make good use
of social media channels to mobilize the masses, as this
gives them power in the new online situation. Finally, the
knowledge that the targeted firms are less able to predict
online protests can add an element of surprise to protests.
For managers faced with protests from external stake-
holders, our first finding is that they should prevent protests
whenever possible. We have shown that online protests
affect a firm negatively in a number of ways, in some ways
regardless of its response. In our experimental study, we
show that even a well-known firm suffers if it is a target of
an online protest campaign. Our results suggest that doing
nothing is the worst possible response, as this exacerbates
the harm done by the online protest. Second, managers
should invest in the development of a proactive online
stakeholder strategy that helps managers enter into a dis-
cussion with consumer communities and concerned groups.
Third, managers should undergo training in response
strategies. Since online protests are highly likely to take a
firm by surprise, there is no time for lengthy discussions or
response optimization at the onset of a crisis. Managers at
all levels of the organization need to know in advance how
to approach an online discussion with protesters.
Limitations and Future Research
In addition to our findings, we highlight a number of our
study’s limitations that present opportunities for future
research. First, the relationship between the effort protest
supporters make and the protest’s effect on the target firm
is a yet to be tested. Kristofferson et al. (2014), for
example, discuss the difference between token support and
meaningful support, whereby meaningful support is pos-
tulated as requiring a significant effort from a participant
and as a prerequisite for bringing about change. A second
limitation is the conceptualization of firm responses (Oliver
1991). There are, however, many other dimensions of firm
responses, such as whether firms communicate their
response to individual consumers or to the public at large.
Future research may examine impression management
(McDonnell and King 2013) and greenwashing effects in
relation to firm response strategies (Lyon and Montgomery
2013; Seele and Gatti 2015). A third limitation is the access
to data on the impact of protests on firms and on the
strategies they have employed. We have therefore chosen
to assess a wide range of cases, whereby we were unable to
delve into each case in great depth. In-depth case studies,
such as process studies, would complement our quantita-
tive study. We urge researchers to study how corporate
decision makers are influenced on an individual level, and
how changes in their perception result in a response to
protest. A fourth limitation is the inability of our approach
to capture the full richness of online protests. Event studies
assume that all other factors remain equal and hence may
overemphasize the effects of recent events, while not
accounting for long-term effects (the ceteris paribus bias).
Hence, we should be careful with strong causal claims. A
fifth limitation of our study is that we do not assess mul-
tiple rounds of protests and responses. Future research may
study multiple protest cycles and subsequent firm respon-
ses. Last, our study assessed the short-term effects of
online protests. Future research may focus on the long-term
effects, such as organizational stigmas perceived by
stakeholders.
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